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Approach to Risk Management
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Risk Management and “Market for
Lemons”
Dr. David Maimon

Andrew Young School of Policy
Criminology and Criminal Justice
Center for Evidence Based Cybersecurity

Risk
• The extent to which an entity is threatened by a
potential circumstance or event.
• Risk is typically a function of:
• The adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance
or event occurs;
• The likelihood of occurrence.

Information Security Risks
• Those risks that arise from loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of information or
information systems and reflect the potential
adverse impacts to organizational operations,
organizational assets, and individuals.

Risk Management
• The process of Identifying , assessing and
evaluating the level of risk facing the organization,
and then deciding what countermeasures to take
in reducing risk to an acceptable level

Risk Management Process (NIST)

Assess
• Identify
• Threats to organizations (i.e., operations, assets, or
individuals)
• Vulnerabilities internal and external to organizations;
• The harm (i.e., adverse impact) that may occur
• The likelihood that harm will occur.

• The end result is a determination of risk

Respond
• Developing alternative courses of action for
responding to risk
• Evaluating the alternative courses of action
• Determining appropriate courses of action
consistent with organizational risk tolerance;
• Implementing risk responses based on selected
courses of action

Monitor
• Determine the ongoing effectiveness of risk
responses

Problem
• The current common approaches for risk
assessment (likelihood and impact) and the
implementation of response are problematic at
best

Likelihood of Occurrence
The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted risk
factor based on an analysis of the probability that
a given threat is capable of exploiting a given
vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities).

Determine the Likelihood a Harm will Occur

Potential Impact
• The magnitude of harm that can be expected to
result from the consequences of unauthorized
disclosure of information, unauthorized
modification of information, unauthorized
destruction of information, or loss of information or
information system availability.
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Risk Assessment
Matrix

Market for Lemons (Akerlof 1970)
• A market with asymmetric information

$2000

$1000

Cybersecurity Market
• Vendors may make claims about the security of
their products, but in the absence of evidence
regarding the effectiveness of the products,
buyers have no reason to trust them.

Solutions for Lemon Markets
• Warranties
• More information regarding the product

The Million Dollar Question
• What should be done in effort to support CISOs’
and General Counsels’ decision making regarding
the assessment of risks as well as the adoption of
security policies and tools within their
organizations?

Evidence-Based Cybersecurity (EBCS)
• Stresses moving beyond decision makers’ political,
financial, social background and personal
experience to a model in which tools’ adoption
and policy enforcements decisions are made
based on scientific studies findings.
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Rigorous Scientific Research Designs

Key Principals of the Approach
Generate and employ empirical evidence to:
- Identify online threats and vulnerabilities and educate
targets of cybercrime
- Guide policy development and guardians’ efforts to
secure cyberspace
- Guide the design and configuration of computing
environments that can mitigate effectively the
consequences cybercrime events

Evidence Based Cybersecurity and
Threat Assessments (Examples)

A Threat-Oriented Approach
• A threat-oriented approach starts with the
identification of threat sources and threat events,
and focuses on the development of threat
scenarios; vulnerabilities are identified in the
context of threats, and for adversarial threats,
impacts are identified based on adversary intent.

The Origin and Time of Attacks Against a
Network (Maimon et al 2013)

Data
• Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) data from a large
university computer network
• Potential attack attempts (unlike for incidents, false alarms might
exist)
• Collected between September 2007 and until 2009

Hourly Distribution of Computer-Focused Crimes
Time of day

9:00am – 4:59pm
5:00pm- 12:59am
1:00am-8:59am

2007
(N = 2,168, 478)
59.04%
16.19%
24.8%

2008
(N = 3,270,895)
38.25%
27.36%
34.39%

2009
( N = 645,554)
50.06%
21.44%
28.5%

Foreign Network Users and Computer-Focused Crimes
Against the Network
2007
IRR

95% CI

2008
IRR

95% CI

2009
IRR

Population between
15-64 years
% Urban

1.13*** 1.06, 1.20 1.15*** 1.09, 1.22 1.18**
*
1.04*** 1.02, 1.06 1.01* 1.00, 1.03 1.03**

Internet users

1.03*** 1.01, 1.05 1.03*** 1.02, 1.05

Foreign network users
per 1000 users
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

1.64*

1.00, 2.98

1.58*

1.05, 2.38

1.02*
1.43*

95% CI

1.10,
1.25
1.01,
1.05
1.00,
1.03
1.05,
1.95

An Asset/Impact-Oriented Approach
• An asset/impact-oriented approach starts with the
identification of impacts or consequences of
concern and critical assets, possibly using the
results of a mission or business impact analyses
and identifying threat events that could lead to
and/or threat sources that could seek those
impacts or consequences.
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Predicted Probability of Students and Non-Students to Click on
Links Embedded in Suspicious Emails while Using University and
Non-University Networks
47%
34%

32%
18%

University Network

Other Network
Student

Not a Student

Predicted Probability of Employees and Non-Employees to Click on
Links Embedded in Suspicious Emails while Using University and
Non-University Networks
39%

37%

34%

17%

University Network
Employee

Other Network
Not an Employee

A Vulnerability-Oriented Approach
• A vulnerability-oriented approach starts with a set
of predisposing conditions or exploitable
weaknesses/deficiencies in organizational
information systems or the environments in which
the systems operate, and identifies threat events
that could exercise those vulnerabilities together
with possible consequences of vulnerabilities
being exercised.

Diffusion of Viruses, Worms and Trojans

Evidence Based Cybersecurity and
Response Effectiveness (Example)

Lévesque et al (2013)
38% of the study participants
were exposed to malware
20% of the computers were
infected by some form of malicious
software that was not detected by
the antivirus

In conclusion,
• Risk assessments should be guided by the design of rigorous
scientific studies and the collection of evidence which will provide
more accurate probabilities of threats to develop
• Rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of cybersecurity tools and
policies could improve the security posture of organizations and
individuals, and in turn, reduce the occurrence of successful
cybercrime events
• To guide CISOs and GC decision making regarding security related
issues, such information should be publicly available and accessible
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